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Abstract
Hoogeveen,  van der  Klaauw, and van Lomwel  focus on  originates. They distinguish household-specific  wealth
the timing of marriages  of women in rural  Zimbabwe.  levels and two types of shocks-correlated  (weather)
Zimbabwean marriages are associated  with bride wealth  shocks and idiosyncratic  shocks.  The authors estimate a
payments,  which  are transfers from (the  family oo the  duration model using a unique  panel survey  of
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In developing countries  economic  markets are often  absent  or incomplete.  Zim-
babwe is no exception.  The absence of economic markets is particularly  severe  in
rural areas, where smallholder  farmers lack access  to formal financial  and insur-
ance institutions.  This implies that these farmers often face  liquidity constraints
and that they cannot insure against  a bad  harvest or loss of livestock.  Whereas
a bad harvest has immediate but generally  temporary consequences  for farmers'
welfare,  the consequences  for welfare of loss of livestock are long lasting.  In rural
Zimbabwe income  from  agricultural production  mainly depends  on two  factors,
sufficient rainfall and the availability of cattle.  Cattle are necessary as draft power
for plowing.  Without  cattle households  can only produce  using the hoe, which
yields little income.  Loss of livestock  might therefore  lead to a household  being
stuck in poverty  for a considerable  period  of time  (see Carter and  Zimmerman,
2000).
The  lack  of formal  financial  institutions  does  not allow  farmers  to borrow
for  investments  in agricultural  production  or  buying  cattle.  A large  range  of
non-market solutions has become available to insure households against negative
shocks  and to  allow them  to smooth consumption  over  time.  Examples of such
non-market  solutions are food  sharing arrangements  in which a household,  who
faced a negative idiosyncratic shock gets food from other households in the village,
and labor sharing arrangements  under  which within a village farmers  take  care
of the land  of someone  who  is  temporary  unable  to  do  so.  Rosenzweig  (2001)
provides  a review  of the  literature  on  informal  insurance  arrangements  in  low-
income countries.
The focus  of this paper  is  on the  timing of marriage  as an  alternative  in-
stitution  for insurance  against the loss  of livestock.  That  marriage  may  act  as
a non-market  insurance  is  due  to the fact that marriage  in  Zimbabwe  involves
bride wealth payments.  These  payments  are made  by  (the family of) the groom
to the bride's family.  Bride wealth comprises of a substantial number  of cattle of
which'a considerable fraction  is paid at the moment  of the actual marriage.  An
unmarried daughter thus represents  access to livestock and her marriage may be
considered  an  asset  that  can  be cashed  in times of adversity.  Because  of bride
wealth payments,  marriages should be considered as a contract between  two fam-
ilies rather than between  two individuals.  However,  the choice  of the spouse  is
generally  not  a  household  decision,  but  an  individual  decision.  Therefore,  we
1do  not focus  on  the  choice  of spouses,  but  instead  consider  the  timing  of the
marriage.
The bride's  family can use the cattle obtained as  bride wealth for increasing
agricultural  production  and  as buffer  stock.  The marriage  decision  of a daugh-
ter is  therefore  more likely  to be  a household  decision  in poor  households  than
in  wealthier  households.  In the empirical  analyses,  we  will  investigate  to what
extent  the timing of marriage  of young women can be explained  by the economic
conditions  of the households  from  which they originate.
There  are many aspects to how shocks  affect marriages.  It is particularly im-
portant to distinguish between  correlated  shocks  induced  by a lack  of sufficient
rainfall and idiosyncratic  shocks to household  for example  as a result  of theft or
death of cattle.  Unlike idiosyncratic  shocks,  correlated shocks  may  have equilib-
rium effects  on  the marriage  market.  If after  a  year  of low  rainfall households
press daughters  to marry,  households may prefer that sons do not marry.  It may
therefore be the case that after a year of low rainfall actually less marriages occur.
However,  this may also have consequences  for the amount of bride wealth.  If after
a year of low rainfall women are more eager to marry than men, then the amount
of bride wealth  is expected to be lower.  We return to these issues in the empirical
analyses,  where  we  will  distinguish between  correlated  and idiosyncratic  shocks
and where we  also  consider the amount of bride wealth.
A strong impact of the household's  economic situation on the timing of mar-
riage suggests  that  formal risk sharing  and credit markets  work  indeed  unsatis-
factorily.  Such  knowledge  can  be beneficial  for  policy,  especially  in the context
of economic  development.  Furthermore,  the presence  of the use of bride  wealth
as an  informal  insurance  device  may cause  women  to  marry  younger.  This  may
affect  fertility  and might  increase  the average  household  size.  This thus has  im-
plications for population growth.
A  dynamic  model  is  required  to  empirically  analyze  the  timing  of a  mar-
riage.  Such  a  model  is  required  because  the  composition  of the  population  of
unmarried  women  in  a particular  year  depends  on  marriages  in previous  years.
If due  to some  shock,  for example  a drought,  in  a particular  year many  women
in poor households  marry,  it follows that in the following year the population of
unmarried  women  shifts towards women  from richer households.  To account  for
this we  use hazard  rates to model  the  age of marriage.  We allow  the transition
rate  from  being unmarried  to being  married  (the marriage  rate)  to depend  on
observed  explanatory  variables,  both  individual,  household  and  environmental
2characteristics,  on the  elapsed  duration  of being unmarried  (age),  and  on  un-
observed  determinants.  To  model  the  relationship  between  the  marriage  rate
and  these variables,  we use a Mixed Proportional  Hazard specification  (see e.g.
Lancaster,  1990).  To  estimate  the  model  we  use  subsamples  of  the data  con-
structed under two different  sampling  schemes, namely flow and stock sampling.
The use of a stock  sample implies that we  have  to correct  for initial conditions,
while constructing  a flow  sample  reduces  the  number  of observations.  We  also
distinguish  different shocks that occur to households.  To construct  idiosyncratic
shocks,  we  use  a  dynamic  model  for household  wealth  accumulation.  This  al-
lows us to separate idiosyncratic  shocks from household  specific wealth  levels and
correlated  shocks.  Finally,  we also perform empirical  analyses on the amount of
bride  wealth payments.  However,  due to the limited information  on the amount
of bride wealth involved with the observed  marriages, the empirical  results based
on the  size of bride wealth  should be interpreted  with care.
The data we use are from an annual panel survey  held under a group of reset-
tlement  farmers in Zimbabwe which  started  in 1982.  In the earlier surveys only
concerned  household level variables,  from 1994 onwards  also detailed information
on  all  members  has been  collected.  We  use  the  subset  of the data  that  starts
in  1994,  which includes  approximately  400  households.  The  data on  household
members  allows us  to construct  subsamples  of unmarried  daughters,  which  in-
clude information  on  the marriage decision,  individual  characteristics  and some
measures  of household  wealth.  Since  the data  we use  in the  empirical analyses
deal  with farmers,  in the remainder  of the paper  we restrict  our  discussions  to
farmers and rural areas.
The paper is organized  as follows.  In Section  2 the institutions of marriage  in
rural Zimbabwe are  considered  in more detail.  Section  3 presents the statistical
model.  Section  4  describes  the  data.  The  estimation  results  are  presented  in
Section  5.  Section 6  concludes.
2  Cattle and marriage in Zimbabwe
In the introduction the importance  of cattle to Zimbabwean  smallholder farmers
as source of draft power for transportation  and especially for plowing was already
stressed.  The heavy  loam soils  in rural  Zimbabwe  require  at  least  two  head  of
cattle,  preferably  trained  oxes,  to  prepare  land  for  sowing.  Without  two  draft
3animals, a  household has  little choice  but to rely on labor intensive  land prepa-
ration  using  the  hoe.  The  income  obtained  from  farming  manually  is  low,  and
insufficient  to buy new cattle.  Money  can be obtained in off farm jobs, but these
jobs  are  hard  to  find  (during  our  observation  period  the  urban  unemployment
rate  was around  50%).  Because of the absence  of formal financial  markets,  bor-
rowing money to buy cattle is impossible.  A household  without cattle can try to
borrow cattle from neighbors after they are done with plowing.  Typically,  by the
time the animals are available,  the time for planting has passed  while the beasts
are tired from their earlier  effort  and of little use.  Households  without cattle can
try to save  (in the  form  of goats  and chicken)  from their meager crop  incomes,
and  in this way  accumulate  the wealth  to buy  cattle.  Yet it might  take  a long
time before  a sufficient  amount is accumulated  (Carter and Zimmerman,  2000).
Households  therefore  have a strong incentive  to  avoid that the number of cattle
becomes too small.
There  are other  reasons  why cattle  are of great  significance  to Zimbabwean
farmers.  Cattle  provide  milk,  produce  manure  to fertilize the  land and  in times
of need  they can  be eaten or sold in return  for grain.'  Selling cows  to buy  food
is  only  relied  upon  as  a  measure  of last resort.  Fafchamps,  Udry  and  Czukas
(1998)  show  for Burkina Faso  for instance  that during  long periods of drought,
cattle  sales  only  compensated  15%  to 30% of income  losses.  Still,  in  Zimbabwe
during the 1992 and  1995 droughts,  the sale of cattle and other livestock  was the
single most  important way to  obtain cash to purchase  food  (see  Kinsey,  Burger
and Gunning,  1998).  The absence  of formal financial  institutions not only makes
cattle  an  important  buffer  stock  it is  also  an important  means  to  keep  savings
(e.g.  Fafchamps,  Udry  and  Czukas,  1998;  Rosenzweig  and Wolpin,  1993).  In
this  light, weight  increase  of a cow  and the birth of a calf can  be considered  as
interest  on these  savings, while the aging of the cattle represents  inflation.  Since
the  possession  of cattle  is vital  for  agricultural production,  cattle ownership  in
Zimbabwe  is  highly  correlated  with  other  forms  of asset  ownership  (Scoones,
1995).  Furthermore,  cattle  can  be used  as legal tender.  Not  only  to settle  debt,
but also in civil or criminal cases  a traditional court  may convict  someone to pay
a number  of cattle.  Finally, Tsodzo  (1992)  argues  that also a great  social  value
is  attached  to  possessing  many  head  of cattle  ("he  who  dispenses  with them,
'Fafchamps,  Udry and  Czukas  (1998)  note that African  farmers  rarely  kill their  cattle for
eating  the meat.  Zimbabwean  farmers  may be even more  reluctant to do so,  since  unlike  in
Burkina Faso, cattle are  used for agricultural  production.
4dispenses  with good living").
Next let us turn to the process of marriage in Zimbabwe.  It is characterized by
duality as the choice of one's spouse is left to the individuals concerned,  while the
marriage itself is considered a contract between families.  The latter is illustrated
by  the  relationship  terminology  that  is  adopted.  After  marriage,  the  groom's
father-in-law becomes father-in-law to the whole of the groom's family,  while the
father of the groom is regarded  as the principle son-in-law rather than the groom
himself.  A brother  of the groom is  likely to speak  in the first  person  saying  "I
have  married such  and such family".
A marriage provides  a bond between  two families,  and Zimbabwean  families
related  through marriage typically share resources  in an effort  to deal with risks.
Families prefer  to spread  the net of affinal  relations  by marrying into different
families.  Marriages  over a long distance or with someone  with a job in town are
considered  with favor as these mitigate the impact of local weather  shocks  (see
also Rosenzweig,  1988, and Rosenzweig  and Stark,  1989).
Zimbabwean  marriages  include  bride wealth  payments,  which  are  transfers
from  the family  of the groom to the family  of the bride.  The direction  of the
payments  depends  on  the  relative  scarcity  of land  compared  to labor.  In  the
relatively  scarcely  populated rural  areas of Zimbabwe,  the groom purchases  the
production  capacity  of the  bride  and of future  children  (e.g.  Jacoby,  1995).  In
India, where  land is scarce  compared  to labor the payments  are usually made in
the  opposite direction,  which  is referred  to as dowry  (e.g.  Rao, 1993).2
Bride  wealth  in  Zimbabwe  consists  of two  distinct  payments,  which  are  re-
ferred  to as  rutsambo and  danga.  Rutsambo is  associated  with  sexual  rights to
the woman  and after  its payment  the girl  is allowed  to move  to her husband's
household.  Danga is  associated  with  rights  over  children  born  to the  woman.
Cattle are the main body of the bride wealth.  On average  9 head of cattle are
demanded  as bride wealth.
At the moment of marriage a substantial part of danga  is paid, but the bulk
of  danga remains  outstanding.  Full  payment  of danga is  extended  over  a long
period of time.  In Figure 1 we show how the fraction of marriages where all bride
wealth  payments  are made  evolves  over  the duration  of the marriage.  For  less
than  10%  of the marriages  all  bride  wealth payments  are  made in the first  few
'See  Binswanger and McIntire  (1987)  and Binswanger and Rosenzweig  (1986) for extensive
discussions on the consequences  of geographic characteristics  on economic  institutions.
5years after  the  marriage.  For  over  80%  of the marriages  some part of the  bride
wealth  payments  is still outstanding after  25 years  of marriage.  The  large drop
occurs  around  30  years  of marriage,  which  implies that for  most marriages  the
final  bride wealth payments  are made  between  28 to  35  years  of marriage.  The
bulk of the bride wealth thus remains outstanding  after the marriage, which  has
advantages  for both the family of the bride and the family of the groom.  For the
son-in-law,  delayed payment  implies that he can  pay when  he  has the  means to
do so.  Moreover,  he can make sure that his wife is childbearing.  Being barren  is
a valuable reason to undo a marriage.  After a divorce or if the wife dies without
giving  birth  to many  children  the  husband  can  claim back  (part  of)  the bride
wealth.  On the other hand,  as  long as  the bride  wealth  is not  completely  paid,
the family of the bride  can ask the groom for favors in the form of services and
gifts.  This is illustrated by a  Zimbabwean  proverb  saying:  "A son-in-law  is like
a fruit  tree:  one never finishes  eating from  it".  Furthermore,  delayed  payments
secure  that a household  that loses  its cattle  still has  access  to  some assets  (see
Dekker and Hoogeveen,  2002).  Therefore,  even if the son-in-law  is in the position
to pay all bride wealth  upon marriage,  it is considered  a denial  of the  marriage
bond  between the families involved  to actually do so.
The  optimal  timing  of  marriage  is  evident.  Unless  the  household  is  very
wealthy  sons  should  marry  late  and  daughters  early.  Late  marriage  of a  son
has several  advantages.  The son remains productive  in the family's agricultural
activities and the loss of draft power is postponed.  This allows (the family of) the
groom more time to accumulate cattle.  If a household  has many  head of cattle,
the marginal productivity of cattle decreases,  as there typically is no labor market
and  the amount  of family labor and  land  are fixed.  So,  if a family has sufficient
cattle,  the marriage  of a son is relatively  rewarding  in terms of additional  labor
received  (the  wife)  and  relatively  cheap  in  terms  of cattle  lost.  If a household
is  poor,  daughters  should  marry  early.  After  the  marriage  of a  daughter  the
previously poor family is able to experience  a period of high productivity before
the marriage of a son is supported.  This period of high productivity can be used to
accumulate  more cattle and to grow out of the initial period of poverty.  Another
reason  why  daughters  should  marry  young  is that  the amount  of bride  wealth
decreases  with  age,  which  reflects  that  relative  to older  women,  young  women
are  likely  to give  birth  to  more  children.  National  data  confirm  this pattern;
the marriage  age of men  is much  higher than  of women  (see  Central Statistical
Office,  1995).  The  median  age  at first  marriage  for men  is  25  years,  compared
6with  19  years  for women.  Only  11  percent  of the men are  married  by the  age
of 20,  compared  to 62  percent  of the women.  The  optimal timing  of marriage
provides  a  testable  implication.  In the  next  sections we  investigate  empirically
whether it is the case that daughters from poorer households marry younger than
daughters from  wealthier households.
So far no attention has been paid to the risks faced  by the households.  Cat-
tle are  subject  to  several  risks  such  as plagues  like pests, theft,  and  periods of
drought.  Pests have had devastating  effects in the past, but  are largely  brought
under  control.  Theft  is  a regular  phenomenon,  and  can  cause  serious  prob-
lems  for the household.  The  consequences  of weather  shocks  are substantial  as
well.  Scoones,  Chibudu,  Chikura,  Jeranyama,  Machaka,  Machanja,  Mavedzenge,
Mombeshora,  Mudhara,  Mudziwo,  Murimbarimba  and  Zirereza (1996)  show that
in  the  Chivi  region  (in  Southern  Zimbabwe)  after  the  1982-1984  droughts  the
number  of households  without  cattle more  than  doubled  from  23.3%  to  50.7%.
During a period  of drought,  farmers  sell  some  cattle  to buy food  necessary  to
survive  (see  Kinsey,  Burger  and Gunning,  1998).  Yet  because  recovering  from  a
period of drought is almost impossible without any cattle, they are very reluctant
to sell cattle.  In Table  1 we present cattle survival rates for the years  1987/1988
and 1991/1992.  The year 1987/1988 was a year with relatively abundant  rainfall
(744mm), while the year 1991/1992  was a year of drought  (only 335mm rainfall).
The table illustrates that in the period of drought  herd losses  of more than 50%
were not exceptional.
Formal institutions that allow smallholder farmers to insure against these risks
do not exist.  Therefore,  households have to use alternative ways to deal with neg-
ative shocks.  Households  can increase their wealth as precaution against negative
shocks.  Above  we already  argued that cattle are the main assets of a household.
Increasing  the  herd  size  might  be  an  option  to  anticipate  the consequences  of
negative  shocks.  Alternatively,  postponing  the  marriage  of  a  daughter  can  be
considered  as a substitute  for precautionary saving.  And since unmarried  daugh-
ters are  not subject  to the risk of theft, postponing the marriage  of a daughter
can  be considered  a portfolio  diversification.  After  a negative  shock  the house-
hold  can  exercise  the 'option  value'  of an unmarried  daughter  to raise  the herd
size  again.  The testable implication  is that shocks  affect  the marriage behavior
of women.  After a negative  shock households  will press their daughters  to marry.
In  the next  sections we  will empirically  analyze the relation  between  shocks and
the age  of marriage.  We  will distinguish  between  idiosyncratic  shocks,  such  as
7theft and death of cattle, and correlated shocks,  such as a period of drought.  The
latter shocks might also have equilibrium effects,  since after a correlated  negative
shock  less households  are willing to pay bride wealth  for sons getting married.
3  Specification  of the statistical model
In  this section  we present  our empirical  model.  We focus  on unmarried  women
and the transition to being married, the marriage rate. We allow the marriage rate
to depend on age, calendar time and a number  of household  characteristics.  The
empirical  model is based  on commonly  used hazard  rate models  (see Lancaster,
1990).  First, we discuss the specification of the marriage rate.  Next, in Subsection
3.1  and Subsection  3.2 we discuss two sampling schemes used to obtain data sets,
stock  sampling  and  flow  sampling.  We  mainly  focus  on  the  consequences  of
the sampling scheme  for the restrictions  necessary  to derive proper  loglikelihood
functions.  We conclude  this section with the parameterization  of the model.
It  is  useful  to start  with  a brief outline  of our  data  and  to  provide  some
characteristics  of the data  that  are  relevant  for  the  model.  A more  elaborate
discussion  of the data  is given  in  the  next  section.  The database  includes  un-
married women,  who are interviewed  yearly.  At the moment  of the interview the
women  are  asked  about  their  marital status  and  age.  Additionally,  a  number
of household  characteristics  are collected.  This allows  us  to construct  spells  of
being unmarried,  although we do not observe  the exact  date of marriage  and the
date  of birth,  but only  the years.  Some  women  are  still unmarried  at the  end
of the observation  period,  and  some other  women  left the database  unmarried,
for  example  because  they temporarily  moved  to relatives.  Such spells  of being
unmarried  are right-censored,  which  we treat as exogenous.
It is  clear  that it  is  not  necessary  to observe  women  from  the  moment  of
birth:  it is sufficient to follow them from the age they start marrying.  We set the
minimum age of marrying at 15, which is denoted by to.  This minimum age is not
due to legal restrictions,  but reflects  the age the statistical bureau of Zimbabwe
uses as  lower bound  for the age  at marriage.  Of the women  born  between  1975
and  1980 less than 3 percent was reported to be married by the age of 15 (Central
Statistical Office,  1995).  This is also confirmed  by our data, which does not show
any marriages  of women  under age  15.
Age and calendar time are genuinely continuous,  but we only observe in which
8year  a woman got married.  To deal with  this discrepancy,  we  use an underlying
continuous-time marriage rate to model the probability that an unmarried woman
of age t > to at calendar time r marries before calendar time r+1.  Since we do not
observe the exact date of birth, but only the age at the moment of the interview,
we  integrate over  the possible dates  of birth.  We assume  that the differences  in
transition rate from unmarried to married can be characterized  by calendar time
r,  a vector  of observed  individual  and household  characteristics  x, unobserved
individual  characteristics  v  and  the elapsed  duration  of being unmarried  t  (age
of the  unmarried  woman).  We assume  v  to  be independent  of x  and  r.  The
unobserved characteristics  are thus individual  specific and not household specific.
The covariates x are not necessarily constant over time, however changes over time
in x are only observed to occur at the moment of the interview  and are assumed
to be  exogenous  and unpredictable.  We  suppress  subscripts  explicitly denoting
that x is time-varying.
The marriage rate at age t conditional  on x, r and  v is denoted  by A(t Ir, x, v)
and  is assumed to have  the familiar Mixed  Proportional Hazard  (MPH)  specifi-
cation
A(tlr,x,v)  = ? 1(t) 2(r)exp(x/  +  v),
in which  0  (t)  and 02 (r)  are positive functions  representing the baseline hazard
or  age  dependence  and  calendar  time effects,  respectively.  The  calendar  time
effects  0/2(r) are  considered  to be changes  in  economic  conditions  faced  by the
household,  which will be represented  by changes  in rainfall.  Let t be the actual
age  when  getting married  and  ro the  calendar  time at birth.  The  conditional
density function  of tlro, x, v can be written  as
f(tfro, x, v) = A(tlro +  t, x, v) exp  f  |  (s[ro + s, x, v)ds),  t > to.
The conditional survivor function of tlro, z, v,  i.e.  the conditional probability that
the duration  of being unmarried  exceeds t, equals
S(tlro, x, v)  = exp  f A(slTo +  s, x, v)ds)  X  t > to.
Obviously,  S(t1mo,  x, v)  = 1 if t < to,  this holds for any value of ro,  x  and v.
Note that in the model  we treat each woman  as an independent observation.
This is not completely  correct  as some  women  live as sisters  in the same house-
hold.  For a household with only few head of cattle, one of the daughters gettingmarried can  be sufficient  to  avoid future  poverty,  implying dependency  between
the marriage  rates  of sisters.  In particular  the marriage  rates  between  sisters
are likely  to be  negatively  correlated.  It also implies that  by treating sisters  as
independent,  we underestimate  the effect  of household's  economic  conditions on
the marriage  rate.  We  do not  correct  for this.  The parameters  we estimate are
no  policy  parameters  and  therefore  we are  more interested  in their signs rather
than their exact values.
In  case  we  observe  women  from  the moment  they  reach  age  to  inference  is
straightforward.  However,  in a given year  the data are sampled  from the stock
of unmarried  women.  In  the following  years we  observe  whether  a woman  gets
married  or  remains  unmarried.  At  this  point  there  are  two  possible  ways  to
proceed.  We  can  either  construct  a  flow  sample  by  only  considering  women
reaching age  15 during the observation period or we can use the complete  (stock)
sample  of unmarried  women  over  age  15.  The  main  disadvantage  of the  first
approach  is that a large share of the data is ignored.  On the other hand the use
of a stock sample of unmarried women causes  initial condition problems,  as some
women who were older than 15 and unmarried at the beginning of the observation
period had already  been exposed to the hazard of getting married for some years
(see  Ridder,  1984).  To solve these  initial condition  problems  it  is necessary  to
make  some  additional  assumptions  on  the  marriage  process,  which  we  discuss
later in more  detail.  Both sampling schemes  therefore  have  disadvantages,  and
we  decide  to  use  both.  We estimate  the  model. first  using the  stock  sample  of
unmarried  women  and second  using  only a  flow  sample  of women  reaching  age
15.
3.1  Inference  based  on stock sampling
When using the full (stock)  sample, the initial condition problems mentioned ear-
lier arise because  the age of the women  at the moment  of entering  the database
differs.  In the economic  literature  some  solutions  to initial  condition  problems
in the context  of duration  models have  been proposed.  For example,  Flinn and
Heckman  (1982)  suggest to specify a separate  hazard function  for spells already
in  progress  at the beginning  of the observation  period.  This approach  can only
be applied  if the data contain multiple spells for single individuals, which is obvi-
ously not the case when modelling the age  at which  a woman first marries.  The
solution  we  use  is from  Ridder  (1984),  who  derives  explicit  expressions  for  the
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women who  were older than  15 when they were first  observed  in the data.  This
implies  that  inference  is  based  on  the joint distribution of the  age  at entering
the sample and the  age of marriage,  conditional  on actually being in the sample.
This method  does  not require multiple  spells, but it requires  additional station-
arity  assumptions.  First,  we  assume  that the rate at which  women  reach  age
15  has been  constant  in the years  before the  observation  period,  i.e.  each  time
period the same number of women reach age  15.  Second, we need to assume that
the composition of women reaching age  15  in terms  of observed  and unobserved
characteristics  has been constant  over time.  And third,  we can only correct  for
time-varying  regressors if the complete history of such a regressor is observed and
the  regressor  affects  the marriage rate of all women  in the same way.  The only
time-varying  regressor  for  which  this holds  is the amount  of rainfall,  which we
also observe before the observation period.  Other possibly important explanatory
variables  such  as the household wealth  are not  known  for the period before  the
observation  period and thus cannot be included in the marriage rate.  Therefore,
the third assumption  may be too restrictive,  as from the discussion in Section  2
we know that the timing of marriage is a decision of both the household  and the
individual, in which the household's  pressure depends on current wealth.
Let  n('r) be the  rate at which  women  reach  age  to  at calendar time  r.  An
indicator of n(r)  could  be  the birth rate  in  year  r - to.  We assume  that the
composition  of the group  of women  reaching  to  does not  change  over  calendar
time and also that household  characteristics  are constant over time.  At the date
of sampling  TB,  the total stock of unmarried women with observed  characteristics
x is proportional to
N(rI  x) Oc J  n(Tr  - t +  to) f  S(tJr,  - t, x, v)dG(v)dt,
in which S(tir8-t,  x, v) is the survivor function, i.e.  the probability that a woman
with characteristics x and v, who was born at date  s - t is still unmarried at age
t,  and G(v)  is the distribution function  of the unobserved characteristic  v.
Suppose in a given year Ts we observe a sample of unmarried women.  For each
woman  we observe her age t and a vector of individual and household character-
istics x.  Furthermore  we  observe that this woman  gets married between  year  r*
and  T*  +  1.  Since  we  do not  observe  the exact  day at which  a woman  reaches
to,  we  have to  integrate  over the  year  at which  this  occurred.  The  same holds
11for the moment of marriage,  which  is also  only observed  at yearly  intervals.  Let
R  denote  the  residual  duration  of  being  unmarried  after  the  date  of sampling
and  P  the  past  duration  of being unmarried  before  the date  of sampling.  The
probability of this observation equals
Pr(R E  [r* - TS,1*  - r- +  1), P  E  [t, t +  1) I In  sample  at rTS  x)
_  f-r.
T l Ift  +  n(s,  - p + to) f, f (p + rlJr  - p, x, v)dG(v)dpdr
N(r  8 Ix)
The  individual contributions  to the  loglikelihood function  are  equal  to  the  log-
arithm  of this probability.3 Within  this  hazard  rate framework  right-censoring,
i.e.  a woman  is still unmarried  at the end  of the observation  period,  is solved  in
a straightforward  manner.
3.2  Inference  based  on flow  sampling
A  flow  sample  is  not  subject  to  initial  condition  problems  as  it  only  contains
women  who  are  observed  from the  moment  they  reach  the  age  at which  they
start  getting married.  Since  the flow  sample  only includes  women  reaching  age
15 during  the observation  period, the cost of avoiding initial condition  problems
is ignoring a large share of the available  data.
Due to the limited length of the observation period we are not able to specify a
complete path of the baseline hazard.  On the other hand we  do not have to make
assumptions  on the stationarity  of the marriage rate, i.e.  the use of a flow sample
allows us to include time-varying  explanatory variables.  The last difference  with
the stock  sampling approach  is that we  do not  need any information  on the rate
at which women  reach  age to  (which  was denoted  by n(T)).
As  in  the stock  sampling  case,  using  the  flow  sample  we  have  to integrate
over yearly  intervals  in  which  the  women  reached  age  15  and  got married.  Let
T be the stochastic  variable denoting  the date  at which a  woman gets  married.
Conditional  on  the year  of  inflow  in the  sample  r-,  i.e.  the  year  in  which  the
women became  15  and the vectors of explanatory variables x,,  r  =  TB,  Sr + 1,....
31t  is also possible to base  inference  on the conditional  probability
Pr(R E [r*  T-r.  + 1)JP E [t,t + 1),  in  sample at rT,x)
This provides  consistent  but less efficient estimators  (see Ridder,  1984).
12the  probability  of getting married  between  year r* and rT + 1 equals
Pr(T E [r*,r*  + l)I  Inflow at is8, r,..  ,Xr-)
fT-r+l  fto+i  f
= 
1 J-a  JO  j  f  (r + plr 8 -p,. xr ...  XT  .Xv)dG(v)dpdr r-  to  v.
The individual contributions to the loglikelihood function are based on this distri-
bution function  and like in the stock sampling approach  right-censoring  is solved
in a straightforward  way.
3.3  Parameterization
For the baseline hazard  function,  0 (t), and the unobserved  heterogeneity distri-
bution, G(v),  we take the most flexible specifications used to date.  We take 4'(t)
to have a piecewise  constant specification,
V), (t) = exp (E  AjIi  (t)  )
where j  is a subscript  denoting time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying  dummy
variables  that are equal to one  in consecutive  time intervals.  Note that with an
increasing number of time intervals  any pattern  can be approximated  arbitrarily
closely.  We take these time intervals equal  to two years.
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity  G(v) to be a discrete
distribution with  a fixed  number  of unrestricted  mass point  locations.  Let  vi,
i =  1,. . .,m be the points of support  and let pi,  i = 1,... ,m be the associated
probabilities,  i.e.  pi  =  Pr(v =  vi),  where  0  < pi  <  1,  i, =  1, . .. ,m  and Pm =
1  p  --  . . - Pm-i. Note  that discrete  distributions  are advantageous  not only
from  the point of flexibility but also from a computational  point of view.
We  also take the calendar time effects +/2 2(r)  piecewise constant.  The calendar
time effect  in a given year is a function of the quantity of rainfall in the previous
agricultural  season,  which  runs  from  the  fourth  quarter  of  a year  to  the  first
quarter  of the next  year.  In  Zimbabwe  most  marriages  take  place  during  the
fourth  quarter  of a  year.  It is  therefore  most  likely  that the  marriage decision
in year  t  is affected  by  the quantity  of rainfall  in the harvest  season  during  the
fourth quarter of year t - 1 and the first  quarter of year t.
134  Data
The  data set we use  is a yearly  panel of Zimbabwean  smallholder farmers cover-
ing the period  1994 until  2000.4  These  households  belong to the group of about
25,000  families that have been  resettled  in the early 1980s on land acquired  from
large-scale  farmers  after  the  independence.  Approximately  400 households  are
interviewed,  living in three different  regions  (Mpfurudzi,  Sengezi and Mutanda).
These  schemes  were  chosen  to ensure  representation  of each  of the three  major
agro-ecological  zones  in the country  which  are suited  for cropping.  Farmers  lo-
cated  in Mpfurudzi  live in the area most favorable  to farming, those in Mutanda
have  to deal  with the  worst  conditions.  Those  resettled  in  Sengezi  live  in an
intermediate  area.
Upon settlement each household was provided with 12 acres of land.  The land
presented  to the households  is about  10%  of the  total area;  the remaining  90%
is common  property land,  which might be used  for grazing.  In the data set  79%
of the households  uses less than the  12 acres of land for agricultural  production,
9%  uses  exactly  12 acres  and the remaining  12%  uses  more than  12 acres.  For
most households the availability of land is thus not the binding constraint in their
agricultural  production  especially  as  households  can  use more  than  12  acres of
land  if  they  (illegally)  reclaim  some  common  property  land  or  rent  land  from
other farmers.
Farmers  in  resettlement  schemes  differ  from  regular  smallholder  farmers  in
Zimbabwe.  The  resettlement  farmers  possess  more  land  and  until  1992  heads
of households  were  not  allowed  to  work  off farm.  This  is  reflected  in the  way
income  is  generated.  Unlike  regular  farmers  who obtain  approximately  30%  of
their income  from non-farm  sources,  the  resettlement  farmers  earn  only  5%  to
10%  of their income off farm.  Farmers in the resettlement  scheme  are also some-
what wealthier  than regular farmers and their per capita expenditures  are about
10%  higher  than  the  per  capita  expenditures  of ordinary  smallholder  farmers
(Deininger  and Hoogeveen,  2002).
The  data  are  collected  by  Bill  Kinsey  and  are  described  in  more  detail  in
Kinsey, Burger  and Gunning  (1998).  The interviews take  place in the beginning
of the year,  and thus  describe  the previous  year.  The  rainy season  is from  the
4The data also includes the survey for 2001.  However, we decided not to use this information
because  starting  in  2000  large  changes  took  place  in Zimbabwe,  especially  in  the  political
situation regarding land reform.
14end  of November  until  the beginning  of April.  This  is immediately followed  by
the  harvest  period  which  takes  until  June/July.  Marriages  usually take  place
in the fall.  Starting  in  1994  information  on  all household  members  is collected
along with  household  level  variables,  whereas  the  1993  interview  only collected
household  level information.
The survey  contains both questions about  the household  and about all indi-
viduals  in the  household.  At  the household  level variables  such as  crop  income
and  livestock  possession  are  administered.  The questions  to the individuals are
about  age,  level  of education,  gender,  marital  status,  etc.  If an  individual  is
not  present at the time of the survey,  but was  recorded  as a household  member
in a previous survey,  the reason  is  asked why  the individual  left the household.
Women  generally  leave  the  household  upon  marriage.  So  by  comparing  pres-
ence  in the  household  and  marital  status in  consecutive  years,  it  is possible  to
construct  spells of being unmarried.5
Since we are interested in the marriage  behavior of young women, we only use
the subset  of the data consisting  of all unmarried  women  whose  age exceeds  15
years  at some interview.  Furthermore,  we restrict the subsample to women under
the age 30,  as older unmarried women  are often divorced or widowed.  In total we
observe  691 unmarried  women  over the age  15, of which in total 233 got married
during the observation  period.  We refer to this sample as the stock sample.  The
empirical  marriage  rate  is shown  in  Figure  2.  It  reflects  an  increasing  pattern
until  age  21.  After that the empirical  marriage  rate fluctuates,  but there  is no
clear  trend.  Figure  3 shows  the  corresponding  Kaplan-Meier  estimates  of the
survival  probabilities,  i.e.  the probability  that  a woman  is  still unmarried  at a
particular  age.  Most  women  marry  before age  30, only  4%  is still unmarried at
this age.  At  age  22  over 60%  of  the women  has  got  married.  The  median  age
of marrying  in  our  data  is  around  21  years  and  thus  higher  than  the  median
marriage  age in Zimbabwe,  which is 19 years  (see Section 2).  Remember that our
data describe  a very  specific  rural  area, where the  (resettlement)  farmers  are on
average  somewhat richer than other farmers.
In  the  stock  sample  around  66%  of  the  spells  are  right-censored.  Right-
censoring arises for two reasons.  First, a woman can still be unmarried at the end
of the observation  period.  Second,  a woman can  leave the household  (therefore
5Generally  daughters do not leave the household for reasons other than marriage.  Sons are
much more likely to leave the household unmarried to seek employment in town and get married
while they are in town.  This makes it more difficult to focus  on the marriage behavior of sons.
15disappearing  from our data set) without having got married.  This happens if a
woman  stays  for some  time with  family  or  relatives  in  another  area,  moves to
work  elsewhere,  or in case the woman  dies.
In Table 2 we present  some annual  statistics of the data,  such  as the number
of marriages,  the average marital age and both local  and average rainfall in Zim-
babwe.6 We  have  stratified  the sample  by the  region  in which  the  women  live.
For each of the three regions both the number of marriages and the average  age of
marriage decrease  over the years.  Also the sample  size  decreases  over the years.
This  is caused  by  the original sampling of the data,  which  includes  households
of which the man was between  35 and 50 years  old in  1982.7  This implies that
more women  leave the sample  (for reason of marriage), than young  (unmarried)
women enter the sample  (because they reach age  15).  Local rainfall is correlated
with average  rainfall in Zimbabwe, but there is variation between the regions.  In
each  of the regions  rainfall  was  lowest  in  1994/1995,  which  affects  the marriage
in  the Fall of  1995.  The  data do not show  strong  differences  in the  number  of
marriages  and the  average  age  of marriage  between  the years  with a large  and
low amount of rainfall.
Table  3 provides  the average  marriage  age stratified by the year of marriage
and the herd size of the household.  In most years, daughters  in the less wealthy
families marry younger than in the  wealthier  families.  However,  the differences
are not very  pronounced.
As  explained  in  Subsection  3.1,  the  empirical  analysis  based  on  the stock
sample only  allows for stationary explanatory  variables.  Not many  variables  are
stationary.  In Table  4  we  give  the characteristics  of the stock  sample.  These
characteristics  are computed  at the individual  level  (of unmarried  women),  and
should  thus not be compared  with averages  at the household  level.  Most women
in the  sample  live in villages  in  Mpfurudzi.  In terms of religious  denomination
around  17%  of the women  reports  to  have African faith  and  6%  Masowe faith.
The remaining  women mostly  have Christian  faith, which  is generally  less strict
than  the  African  and  Masowe  faith.  For around  10%  of the women  household
characteristics  are missing, we include a dummy variable for these women.  House-
hold size  is not  really a stationary  variable.  For the moment we take it as being
6The local rainfall data and the Zimbabwean rainfall data axe  collected  by the Department
of Meteorological  Services  in Zimbabwe.
7A family remains  in the data until both the man and woman die.  After that this household
is replaced  by the people who move into their house (most likely sons or daughters).
16stationary,  measuring  the  household  size  at  the  moment  a  girl first  appears  in
the stock sample.  Household size is relatively  constant over the years, on average
the women  live in  households  containing  around  12  persons  (including the par-
ents).  In  17%  of the cases  the father  is missing in the household  and in 4%  the
mother.  The father is usually older than the mother and has on average  1 year of
education more.  These  are the only variables  in the database that are stationary.
The flow sample  consists of all women  who reached  age  15 during the obser-
vation period.  This  gives a sample of 333  women  (originating  from 302  different
households),  of  which  57  got  married  during  the  observation  period.  Table  5
shows the  number of women  in the  flow sample  at the beginning  of a year  and
the number of marriages in that year.  Because the sample size is relatively  small
we do not stratify by region.  It is clear from the table that most marriages occur
in the last three years of the observation  period.  During the first three years,  the
women in the flow  sample are all younger  than  18 years.  The  marriage  rate for
this age group  is low  (as can  be seen from the empirical marriage  rate in Figure
2).
In  Section 2  we stressed  the relation  between household  wealth and marriage
behavior.  We argued  that cattle is the most important  asset  of households.  As
a measure  of household  wealth  we  therefore  include  livestock  wealth  expressed
in the number  of cows.  In Table  6  we show  the average  livestock  wealth in each
year  for the subsample  of women  who  got married  in that year  and  those  who
remained unmarried.  We  see that in each year  except  for  1999, the women  who
got married  came  from  poorer  households.  Recall  that  in the first  three  years
the  number  of marriages  was  very  low.  The  difference  in  wealth  between  the
subsamples  is particularly  large in  1998, which was  a year  following the relative
dry year  1997.  It  seems  a  confirmation  of the  household  insurance  hypothesis
suggesting that after a negative  shock women in poor households  are more likely
to get married.  However,  it might be the case that there  are households that are
always poor and households that are always  rich.  If girls from poorer households
prefer  to marry younger  for  instance  because  living in  a  poor household  is  not
very pleasant,  then  we  could observe  a similar pattern.  To get an  indication on
how  big shocks  in household  wealth  are compared  to the distribution  of wealth
between  the households,  we compare the average  standard  deviation of livestock
wealth  of  households  (over  the  years)  with  the  standard  deviation  of average
wealth  of households  (over  the years).  The  average  value of livestock  is around
11.7 cows,  the average standard deviation of household  livestock  wealth 3.3 cows
17and the standard deviation of average wealth of households 8.9 cows.  This implies
that there  are indeed  generally  richer  and poorer households,  but  being rich  in
one particular year  does  not  guarantee  being  rich  in the next year.  In general,
we  see  that the average  livestock  wealth  of households  is  increasing during  the
observation period  as households  are recovering from the drought in 1991/1992.
We  return  to the issue of separating  shocks  in livestock  wealth from  household
specific livestock  wealth  levels in  the next section.  Another variable we  include
is  an  indicator  for  being  the  oldest  unmarried  daughter  in  the  household.  If
the  timing  of a  marriage  is  indeed  a  household  decision,  a (temporarily)  poor
household  will most  likely put pressure  on the oldest  unmarried daughter  to get
married.  Furthermore,  in  the  flow  sample  we  treat  household  size  as  a  time-
varying regressor.
The data contain some information on the amount of bride wealth paid  (and
especially  on the amount of danga, i.e.  the most substation payment  related  to
the rights over children, see Section 2).  This variable needs to be interpreted  with
care.  The information  on bride wealth paid is affected  by item non-response,  and
bride wealth paid is only observed  at the household  level, as the total amount of
bride  wealth obtained  in the previous  year.  It is thus not related to a particular
marriage.  By combining  the  individual  data on  marriages  with the  household
data on  bride wealth,  we relate  bride wealth  to marriages.  In  particular,  if we
observe  the  household  receiving  bride  wealth  we  link  this  to  the most  recent
marriage  that occurred  in this  household.  For  the year  2000  we did not  obtain
any information  on bride  wealth.
On  the  basis  of the  bride  wealth  data,  we  create  two  variables.  The  first
variable  contains  the amount  of bride wealth  received  by  the household  in the
year  of marriage,  which  we  refer  to  as  short-term  bride  wealth.  The  second
variable,  which  is  called long-term  bride wealth  is  the  accumulated  amount  of
bride wealth received by the household in the year of marriage and the following
years  in the  observation  period.  However,  recall  that it usually takes around  30
years until the total amount of bride wealth has been paid, while we only observe
yearly payments  over a maximum  of 5 years.  The total  amount of bride wealth
we  observe is therefore an underestimate  of the actual total amount.  We  restrict
our  attention to households  for which  we observe  household characteristics.  For
these  households  we  observe  424  marriages  in  the data.  However,  we  only find
bride wealth information for 128 of them.  In the sample the average  bride wealth
consisted of around  1300  Zimbabwean  dollars  (either in cash or  in cattle).
18With respect  to long-term bride wealth we only include marriages until  1997,
otherwise  the  total observed  bride  wealth  would  be  too  much  affected  by  the
remaining  length  of  the  observation  period  after  the  year  of marriage.  This
subsample includes 174 marriages.  For 156 of these 174 we observe bride wealth.
The  average  bride wealth was approximately  2200  Zimbabwean  dollar.
5  Estimation results
In this  section  we  present the  estimation results  of the empirical  analyses.  We
first discuss  the estimation  results obtained  with the stock sample of unmarried
women.  After  that we  consider  the results based  on the  flow  sample  of women
reaching  age 15 and compare both estimation results.  Finally, estimation  results
concerning the amount  of bride wealth are discussed.
5.1  Estimation  results based on the stock sample
For estimating the parameters of the marriage  rate using the stock sample, it is
necessary  to have  information  on the rate at which women reached  age  15 prior
to the  observation  period,  n(r)  (see  Subsection  3.1).  Unfortunately,  we do  not
observe  any  measure  of inflow,  or  alternatively,  the birth rate  15 years  prior to
Tr.  We therefore assume this to be constant, n(r) =  1, for each r. We specify the
piecewise  constant  baseline hazard  in terms  of two  years  and  +(r)  =  eXP(
6 rr,k)
with  r,,k denoting the quantity  of rainfall  in region  k in the  agricultural  season
before  year r.  Hence,  we estimate the parameters  vi,  pi  (i =  1, 2, . . ., m),  Aj:j+l
(j  = 15,17, . . ., 29),  ,,  which  is a vector  of parameters  capturing the  covariate
effects,  and 6, which  is the effect  of rainfall on the marriage rate.  We normalize
by  taking A15:16 = 0 and Pm = 1 - P1 - p-Pm-i.  The model parameters  are
estimated using Maximum  Likelihood.
Table  7  presents  the  parameter  estimates  obtained  with  the  stock  sample.
We find two points of support of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity
term  (m = 2).  78%  of the probability  mass is at one point.  The remaining  22%
of the women  has a much lower  marriage  rate.  The baseline  hazard  shows  how
the marriage rate is affected  by the  age of an  unmarried  woman.  It shows that
the marriage rate increases  with age.
The  main  parameter  of interest  is  6,  which  represents  the  effect  of rainfall
on  the  marriage  rate.  The  parameter  estimate  is  negative  as  expected  from
19the  discussion  in  Section  2.  It  is  not  significantly  different  from  0.  However,
given the small sample size  and the relatively  small variation  in local rainfall,  it
would be too ambitious to expect the convenient  levels of significance.  During the
observation period the quantity of rainfall varied from around 0.5 meter in 1994 to
around 1 meter in 1996 and 1998.  This implies that in 1995 the marriage rate was
on average only around 2.5%  higher than in 1999, i.e.  exp(O.05 *0.5) - 1 ;:  0.025.
The impact of rainfall on the marriage rate is thus very low.  As mentioned before
local rainfall is correlated  with the average  rainfall in Zimbabwe  (e.g.  Table 2).
Like  brides  (and their families)  grooms suffer  from the negative  weather  shocks
as  well.  After  a drought  they  are  likely to  be reluctant  to get  married  and to
pay bride wealth.  So even  if households  put  pressure  on their daughters  to  get
married  after  a  bad rainy  season,  the number  of marriages  might increase  little
because  of the unavailability of grooms.
In the estimation  we omitted  the age and  the years  of education  of the par-
ents.  The  corresponding  parameter  estimates  were  very  close  to 0  and  highly
insignificant.  The marriage  rate is highest  for women living in Mpfurundi.  The
women  in the other regions  on average  marry  later.  Women  with  Masowe  faith
marry  later than women with African faith or Christian faith.
Household  characteristics  may  reveal  to what  extent  the timing of marriage
is  a  household  decision.  The size of the household  has  a  positive  effect  on  the
marriage rate, implying  that daughters  living in larger households  marry on av-
erage,younger.  This is intuitive, as for  a large  household the loss of labor due to
a marriage  is less severe.  The amount  of land is fixed,  so the marginal produc-
tivity of a daughter  in larger  households  is smaller  than in  smaller  households.
Furthermore,  in  case  one  of the parents  is  absent,  the marriage  rate  is  lower,
particularly  if the father  is absent.  We do not know the reason  why a parent  is
absent,  but recall that the father is much more often absent than the mother,  in
17%  and 4% of the households  respectively.  A father  who is absent  may work  in
the city, although as noted earlier finding work in the city is difficult.  If the father
is absent  because  of work in the city, the yearly  income of the household is likely
to be more stable.  Therefore,  household  behavior is less sensitive to shocks and
their need for cattle  (as  buffer stock)  is  reduced.  The latter corresponds  to the
empirical  fact that single-headed  households are less well endowed with livestock
than two-parent  households.  If the father works in the city, the household  is less
dependent  on the income from agriculture,  which means that the household  does
not  need  the  labor of the children  (although  it  might be  that in single-headed
20households  children  have  to perform  (part  of) the tasks  of the missing parent).
This affects the marginal productivity of a child in a single-headed  family.
5.2  Estimation  results  based on the flow sample
Inference  based  on the stock sample  does not allow us to investigate the effects
of household wealth  on  the timing of the marriage.  To investigate  this we base
inference  on the flow sample.  The specification of the hazard is to a large extent
similar  as  in  the  previous  subsection.  However,  the  short  observation  period
only allows us to estimate the baseline hazard  until age 20.  Furthermore,  we now
consider household  size as a time-varying  regressor and we include two additional
regressors,  the household's livestock wealth  and a dummy variable for being the
oldest  unmarried  daughter  in  the  household.  Since  the  flow  sample  does  not
contain  a large number  of women  with absent  mothers,  we replace  the dummy
variables for an absent father and for an absent mother by a single dummy variable
indicating that the household  is single-headed.
The parameter estimates of the  flow sample procedure are presented in Table
8.  We  do  not  find  any  significant  unobserved  heterogeneity.  During the  opti-
mization of the loglikelihood function both mass points converge to a single mass
point.  In  general,  standard  errors  when  using the  flow  sample  are  larger  than
when  using the  stock  sample.  This  is  not  surprising as  the  flow  sample  only
contains half of the women  in the stock  sample  and has  a much  higher fraction
right-censored  spells.  However,  in most cases the parameters have  the same sign
as the stock sample parameter estimates.  Again we  see that the marriage rate in-
creases with  age and that women living in Mpfurudzi  marry on  average younger.
Also faith  and household  size have about the same effects on the hazard  rate as
above.  The significant  effect  of household  size in the flow  sample  (where  we  also
correct  for  household  wealth)  might  indicate that for  large  families  the  conse-
quences  of the loss  of labor following a girl leaving the household  may not be as
dramatic  compared  to small families.  Alternatively,  large  households  are likely
to have  many sons,  which are  (due to bride wealth)  claims on  household wealth.
Ideally,  a marriage  of daughter  precedes  a marriage  of a  son,  and  thus  women
living in households with many brothers have more pressure to marry.  Therefore,
we have tried to replace household size with the number of sons in the household.
This did not  affect the parameter  estimate.  Both variables  are too correlated to
include them jointly.
21Remarkable  is that the effect  of living in a single-headed  household is positive
which suggests that  women  in single-headed  households marry earlier.  As men-
tioned  earlier single-headed  households  own  less livestock than  households  with
two parents;  their livestock wealth is about 20%  lower.  The positive covariate ef-
fect of living in a single-headed household  is therefore  reinforced  by the negative
covariate  effect  of living  in  a  poor  household.  This contradicts  the estimation
results  obtained  using the stock  sample.  As mentioned  earlier,  in  single-headed
households  most often  the father  is absent.  If the father  is working  in the city,
the  household  is  less dependent  on  agriculture  and  the  labor of their  children.
The girls can just marry at a younger  age.
The main difference  between the estimation  results of the stock sampling and
the  flow  sampling  is  the effect  of the amount  of rainfall  on  the marriage  rate.
When  using  the  flow sample,  the  effect  of rainfall  on the marriage  rate  is posi-
tive, implying that more marriages occur after  a season  with more rainfall.  It is
clear  that  in  the  flow  sample  model the  effect  of rainfall should  be  interpreted
differently,  as  in the  flow  sample  we  also control  for  the  household's  livestock
wealth.  The  amount  of rainfall  in  this  case  is  thus merely  a marriage  market
effect,  i.e.  a season of low  rainfall reduces  the number of men available  for mar-
riage.  The effect that due to a negative  rainfall shock more women want to marry
to compensate  the reduction  in household  wealth,  is now picked  up by the live-
stock wealth variable.  Finally, we should note that because  of the flow sampling,
most marriages  occur in the last years of the observation  period.  Therefore,  the
estimated  effect might be not very robust.
Now  consider  the two  variables  we  added to the model.  The  effect  of being
the oldest unmarried daughter in the household is positive.  The marriage  rate of
the oldest  daughter  is 57%  (= exp(O.45)  - 1) higher than the marriage  of a girl
of the same  age,  who  has  an older unmarried  sister.  This is  in agreement  with
the hypothesis  that the timing of marriage  is  a household  decision  rather  than
an individual  decision.  In  case a  household  would  like one of their daughters to
get  married,  the  oldest  daughter  is  most  likely to  be  pressed  to  do  so.  There
are two main  reasons.  First,  the amount  of bride  wealth  is decreasing  faster  in
age  for older  girls  (if a women  marries  at young  age,  she  will most  likely  have
more children).  So,  the opportunity  costs  of staying  unmarried  for some  period
are  highest  for the  oldest  daughter  in  the household.  Second,  other  daughters
could  easily  argue  against  the  parents'  pressure  to  marry  on  the  ground  that
they have an  older unmarried  sister.  Since the model takes account  of the age  of
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daughters  is most likely to be  higher than of the other unmarried  women.
The other additional regressor  is livestock wealth,  which has a negative effect
on the marriage  rate.  Women  from  less wealthy households  marry at a younger
age  than women  from  richer  households.  This is in accordance  with  the theory
presented  in  Section  2, which  argued that marriage  of a daughter  is a possibility
to access  livestock  assets.  To get some feeling for the magnitude of the effect  of
livestock  wealth  on the marriage  rate,  we  compare  the  marriage  rates  in three
households.  The first household is a poor household that only has 2 cows,  which
might be just enough for plowing (if both are healthy).  The second household has
5  cows,  which guarantees  enough draft  power for this year, but is not considered
as buffer stock.  The third  household  is wealthy  and has 8 cows,  it thus has some
buffer  stock.  The  marriage  rate  of daughters  in the first  household  is  around
8.8%  higher than  the marriage  rate  in the  second  household  and  18.3%  higher
than the marriage rate in  the third household.
Based on these estimation results, it cannot be ruled out that this effect is due
to the fact that daughters living in poor household have a strong incentive to leave
the  household, just to  escape  bad  living conditions.  To get  some  more  insight
in what  drives the  effect  of livestock  wealth  on marriage,  we  extend  the  model
by  separating the  livestock  wealth  in  a fixed  household  component  77,  which  is
constant  over time,  and time-varying  shocks  Et  in household wealth.  We cannot
simply  take  77  equal  to  the  mean  household's  livestock  wealth  over  the  years
and st  as the difference  between  the household's  livestock  wealth  in year  t and
the mean  household's  livestock  wealth.  If a  marriage  occurs  the bride  wealth
payments  increase  the  mean  household's  livestock  wealth,  which  implies  that
before  the moment  of. the marriage  Et  would  be  too low  and  after  the moment
of marriage  too high.  This  might cause  spurious  relations  between  shocks  and
the marriage  rate.  Therefore,  to obtain  estimates  for  77  and  Et  we  estimate  a
dynamic  panel  data  model  for  livestock  wealth  accumulation  (that  also  takes
marriages  into account),  7 is-the household  specific effect  in the model and E are
the disturbances  in the model.  The procedure  is described  in detail in Appendix
A.  The  estimation  results  are  given  in  Table  9.  As  can  be  seen,  the  effect
of a  shock  in  the  livestock  wealth  is  more  important  than  differences  between
household  specific  components.  This  implies that  the effect  of livestock  wealth
on  the marriage  rate  described  above  is  induced  by  (unanticipated)  shocks  in
livestock  wealth rather  than  by existing  wealth  differences  between  households.
23The  effect  of an  (unanticipated)  shock  in  the household's  livestock  wealth  on
the  marriage  rate  is  significant.  If  a household  loses  2  head  of cattle,  due  to
an unanticipated  event  such  as theft,  the marriage  rate of the daughters  in this
household  increases  with around  22%.
We  have  tried  adding other  explanatory  variables  to  the  model.  However,
this  did not  improve  the  fit,  i.e.  the parameter  estimates  were  very  close  to  0
with  relatively  large  standard  errors  and  no  improvement  in  the  loglikelihood
function.  In particular,  we  added equipment  owned  by  the household  and total
acres  of land  used  in agricultural  production.  It should  be stressed  that  these
variables are highly correlated with livestock wealth, which implies that potential
covariate effects  of such regressors are already  covered by livestock wealth.
5.3  Analyzing the amount  of bride wealth  payments
Finally, we performed  some empirical analyses on the amount of the bride wealth.
As  mentioned  in  Section  4  the data on the amount  of the  bride  wealth  are  not
very  precise  and do not  cover  a sufficiently  long period  to  observe the  payment
of total  bride  wealth  as  payments  most  often  take  as  much  as  30  years.  The
estimation  results  should therefore  be  interpreted  with  care.  For the empirical
analyses  we  use tobit  models.8 We perform  two analyses,  the first  one  based  on
the amount of bride  wealth  received during the year of marriage  and the second
based on the accumulated  amount of bride wealth received during the observation
period  after the marriage.  The  latter also includes  the  bride wealth  received  in
the year  of marriage.  As explanatory  variables we  include  age  of the daughter
8Since  we only  observe the amount  of bride  wealth  for a subsample  of the  data, the ideal
model would  be  a sample  selection model.  However,  identification  of sample selection  models
hinges on  exclusion  restrictions.  In our data there  is no variable  that would  qualify for  being
excluded  from the equation denoting the amount of bride  wealth, but included in the equation
describing  if the household  reports  having received  bride  wealth.  Therefore,  we use  a simpler
censored regression  or tobit  model,
y  =x/3+E
and
_  if  y'>O
Y  if  y'<O
The interpretation of this model is that bride wealth is observed with a large measurement error
c, and that households  only  report having received  bride  wealth  if the bride wealth  including
the measurement  error  exceeds 0.
24at the moment of marriage,  amount of rainfall, an indicator for being the oldest
daughter  and livestock wealth in the year before marriage.
The estimation results are given in Table  10.  Except for rainfall all covariate
effects on the amount of bride wealth received in the year of marriage,  are opposite
to the effect on the total amount of the bride wealth.  Obviously, some households
prefer a relatively  large amount of bride wealth at the moment of marriage  over
a  larger over-all  amount  of bride  wealth.  The  amount of bride  wealth  received
at  the first  year is higher  in relatively  dry years,  for poorer  households  and if it
is the  oldest  daughter  who  marries.  Above  we  already  explained  that  since  we
also correct for age, the dummy variable for oldest daughter  can be interpreted  as
an indicator  for household  pressure.  It is clear that households  who bargain  for
a relatively  large  initial payment  of bride  wealth,  have to accept  low  payments
in the following years.  This observation  is in accordance  with  the  discussion  in
Section 2, that poor households can escape  a period of poverty by the marriage of
a daughter,  but suggests that after  the substantial  initial transfer  a period with
low transfers  follows.
6  Conclusions
This  paper  focuses  on  the timing  of marriage  in  rural  areas  in  Zimbabwe.  In
these rural  areas farmers live who obtained  12  acres of land from a resettlement
program  in the early  1980s.  To work  the land cattle is  required;  without cattle
agricultural  production  is  minimal.  The  absence  of access  to formal  financial
institutions to smallholder farmers causes that households cannot borrow to buy
cattle if they do  not possess  sufficient  cattle for plowing.  Since finding  off-farm
jobs is  extremely  difficult  and the  return to manually working  the  Welds  is  low,
households without cattle may get stuck in poverty  for a long period.  Due to the
existence  of bride wealth,  which  is a transfer from  (the family of)  the groomr  to
the family of the bride,  a  daughter's  marriage is  a possibility  to  acquire cattle.
An  unmarried  daughter  could  therefore  be  considered  as  an  asset  that  can  be
cashed  in bad times.
In  the  empirical  analyses  we  focus  on  the  influence  of weather  shocks  and
(shocks to) household cattle wealth on the timing of a daughter's marriage.  If in-
deed the marriage behavior depends on shocks, the composition of the population
of unmarried  women  in a year depends on shocks in the previous years.  To take
25account  of these  dynamics,  we use a mixed proportional  hazard rate  framework
to model the age of marriage.
By focusing on  the  timing of a  marriage  of a daughter,  we  only provide  a
partial picture  on the  marriage  market.  We do  not observe  any information  on
the choice  of spouses.  However,  the lack of information on the choice  of spouses
makes it impossible to extend this picture.
For the empirical analyses  we rely on a unique panel data set on Zimbabwean
smallholder  farmers.  Due to all kinds  of shocks  the wealth  of the smallholder
farmers  fluctuates  enormously  over  the years,  i.e.  being wealthy in  a particular
does not guarantee  being wealthy  in next years.
The estimation  results show that in the stock sampling model  the impact  of
rainfall  on  the  rate  at which  women  marry  is  negligible.  However,  if we  also
control for the household  livestock  wealth,  the amount of rainfall has a positive
effect on the marriage rate.  This is most likely a marriage market effect,  i.e.  after
a period  of low rainfall the supply of men is lower as not that many  households
are capable  of paying  bride  wealth.  The  marriage  rate  of daughters  is higher
for poorer households.  In particular,  after a negative  shock in livestock  wealth
the marriage rate of daughters increases.  Furthermore, the marriage rate for the
oldest daughter in the household is higher.  Both these effects confirm the hypoth-
esis that households  use  an  unmarried daughter as an  asset that can be cashed
in bad  times.  The marriage  decision  should therefore  not only be considered  as
a decision of the individuals  involved, but also as a household  decision.
We  also  considered  the  amount  of bride  wealth.  These  estimation  results
provide  additional  evidence  that  the  timing  of marriage  is  used  as  means  to
avoid  being  stuck in  poverty.  In  particular,  less  wealthy  households  receive  a
larger initial payment at the moment a daughter gets married.  The accumulated
amount  of bride  wealth  they  receive  in the  first years  of marriage  is  relatively
low, so that the relatively high initial payment goes at the expense of subsequent
payments.  In other words,  a period of poverty is only avoided at the expenses of
receiving  lower payments  in the subsequent  years.
Our results  have  policy  relevance.  In  particular,  the  use of marriage  as an
alternative financial  institution affects  the  age at which daughters  marry.  This
might have negative external effects.  If women marry young, they are more likely
to  have  more  children.  Furthermore,  households  might want  to have  at least  a
particular number  of daughters to act as insurance  against negative  shocks.  This
induces  households  to have more children  (especially if the first children  born to
26the family are boys).
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29A  Separating household specific effects and shocks
In this appendix  we  briefly discuss our method for estimating the marriage rate
that includes  a fixed household component for livestock  wealth and a component
that describes idiosyncratic shocks in the household's  livestock wealth.  We obtain
information on both components  from a dynamic panel  data model for livestock
wealth  accumulation.  First,  we  provide  and  estimate  the  model  for  livestock
wealth  accumulation  and next  we  discuss  how these  estimation results are  used
in estimating the marriage rate.
A.1  Dynamic model for livestock wealth  accumulation
Our data  set contains  information  on H households  that  are denoted  by  h =
1,. . . ,H.  The panel is unbalanced,  however,  the number of years Th for which we
observe  household h is exogenous.  For a particular year t =  1, . .., Th, the house-
hold's livestock  wealth  Wh,t  (measured  in  cows)  depends  on  (i)  the household's
livestock wealth one year earlier Wh,t-1,  (ii) a dummy variable  mh,t that indicates
if a  daughter  in  the  household  married  between  the  survey  in  year  t - 1 and
year t,9 (iii) the size of the household  Sh,t-j during the survey  in year t - 1, (iv)
the amount of rainfall rt-I in year t  - 1, and  (v)  some household characteristics
Zh  that are  constant  over  time.  These  latter  household  characteristics  include
dummy  variables  for living  in the Mutanda  and  the  Sengezi  region, for  having
the African  faith and Masowe faith,  and for living in a single-headed  household.
The household's livestock  wealth accumulates  according  to the model
Wh,t =  10  +  /lWh,t-1  + P2mh,t  + 0
33h,t-l  + fl4rt-I +  ZhP5 +  17h  + eh,t,
where 
1 h  is an unobserved household specific wealth component and  Eh,t  are ran-
dom shocks.  These are the two components that we want to include as regressors
in the marriage rate.  We assume that both 77h and Eh,t follow a normal distribution
with mean  zero  and variance  2  and a2 respectively.
The household specific wealth component 
T7h  is not independent  of Wh,t-1.  To
9As mentioned  earlier  not  all  bride wealth  is  paid  in  the  year  of  marriage,  which  might
suggest that we  should also include the dummy  variables for marriages lagged.  However,  bride
wealth payments are most substantial in the year of marriage and bride wealth payment schemes
are not  similar.  Furthermore,  we do not observe marriages occurring  before 1994,  so including
these lagged variable  would reduce the length of our panel considerably.
30get rid of  7h,  we take first differences,
AWh,t  =  31AWh,t-1  +  /2117mh,t  +  03ASh,t-1  + / 4Art_i +  /Ah,t
However,  the  new regressor  AWh,t-I  obtained after  the transformation  is corre-
lated with the error term  Ceh,t  (as Wh,t1i  depends on Ch,t-l).  Also marriage  mh,t
might depend on shocks  in household's  livestock  wealth  one  year  earlier,  which
suggests that mh,t can be correlated with Eh,t-1.  Therefore,  we will use two-stage
least squares  (2SLS)  to estimate the model,  where  in the first stage  we estimate
Wh,t-1  =  ')O + 71Wh,t-2  +  Y2Wh,t-3  +  Y3mh,t-1  + Y4ASh,t-1  +  75ASh,t-2
+  /6,rt-1 +  77Art-2 +  Uhlt
Amh,t  =  JO  +  SlWh,t-2 +  S2Wh,t-3  +  63mh,t-1  + S4ASh,t-1 +  65ASh,t-2
+  56Art_1  + S7Art-2 +  Uh,t
This 2SLS procedure  provides consistent estimators i1, 12 and  33  (as H  - o).10
As an estimator for  OE2,  we  use
L,,  HlT  Th  2  ht
where
Uh,t =  Wh,t - lWh,t-1 - 42mh,t-  3Sh,t-1  -44rtI
When  computing  the standard  errors  for  /1,  /2,  P3  and  /4  we  have  corrected
for correlation  between  AEh,t  and  Aeh,t_,  i.e.  COV(A6h,t-1,A6h,t)  =  -O2  and
var(A\h,t) =  2a02.  The estimation  results are given in Table  11.
Next, we  estimate the parameters  Bo and  /5.  Therefore,  we use the regression
Th
-E  Lh,t  =  00 +  Zh,65 +  eh
h  t=l
where it can  be shown that
1  1  h
eh  = 
71h +  T  E  Eh,t +  T- Z(/1 - 41)Wh,t-1 +  (/2 - 42)mh,t
+  (/3 - /3)Sh,t-1  + (/4--4)rt-,
t "We  have performed  a Sargan-test  to test the specification  of our model  and the validity of
the set of instrumental  variables.  The value  of the test statistics equals  4.51.  Since  it follows
a x2-distribution  with  3 degrees  of freedom,  we cannot reject  that the model is misspecified  or
that  the instrumental  variables are invalid.
31We  can  use  OLS  to estimate  the  parameters  i03  and &5,  but when  computing
standard  errors  we  should  take  into  account  that  the  disturbances  eh  are  all
correlated  with  each  other  and that  they  suffer  from  heteroskedasticity.  The
estimation results are reported  in Table  12.
As will become clear below, we need to know the complete variance-covariance
matrix  of  [3o;  5]3] and  [/i1; 12;  3;  /4].  This  implies  that  we  also should  es-
timate  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  estimators  [Po;AT]  with  the  estimators
71;:2;  73; i4].  We  know that
[:  _:  ]  =  ([6; z], I;  Z]) -I[t; Z]  [* 
where t is a vector containing is and Z is a matrix with the vectors Zh.  As we know
how eh depends on  /31,  /2,  /3,  and  44,  we get an expression  for the covariance ma-
trix between  [Ao; /53]  and  [A 1; /2;  /3;  &4] .Let the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of the estimators  [&  o;;  412; /3;  4; A 5]  be given by Qf.
A.2  Including  a  household  specific  effect  and  shocks  as
regressors  in the marriage  rate.
The marriage  rate  is  specified  at the  level  of daughters  instead  of  households.
Woman  i  =  1,... , N  lives  in a  household  with  household  specific  effect  iji  and
yearly shocks are eij, . . -, Ei,T.  The characteristics  of the women are given by xi,,,
where  T  denotes the year  in which these  are observed.  As shown in  Section  3.2
the likelihood function  for the flow  sample equals
N
J7  Pr(T E  [Tri-,  ,r  +  1)!  Inflow at rs,i,  xi,,r,  X i,r,-,7i, Eir,  ...  *Ei.-)
i=l
If we would  know the values of r,i  and Ei,7,  we could just optimize the logarithm
of this likelihood function  to obtain the parameter  estimates.  However,  instead
of 77i  and Ei,r  we observe  the estimated residuals
Vh,t  =  Wh,t  - 40-tlWh,t-I  - /2mh,t-  3Xh,t-1  - / 4 rt 1 - Zh45
32We should  therefore  optimize  the loglikelihood  function
log (I|  Pr(T E  [Ti,  ri  +  1) I Inflow at TO.i Xi  Z,r,,  . . *  X i,T' i 7i  6i;r.?  .*  *  *i,r-)
f  (77  E61)  d(,q  E))
where 77  is a vector containing  all household specific effects,  E is a matrix contain-
ing for all households  all yearly shocks and 0 is a matrix containing the elements
Vh,t.
The remaining problem is to specify the density function f (i7,  E|V).  We rewrite
this density function by conditioning on a matrix v containing the elements Vh,t  =
77h +  Eh,t, as
f (77,  mEJ)  =  Jf(?7,Iv,  )f (v[)dv
It is clear that  if we  know  v,  then 0  is not informative  about 7 and E,  thus
f  (77,  E|V, V)  =  f  (7,  E|V)
This density function can  be written  as
H
f(mq,E|V)  =  f (7h,  Eh,l  ...  **h,ThIVh,j, **,Vh,Th)
h=1
H
°c  r  f  (Vh,l,  *  -*, Vh,Th 17h, eh,,  *  *  *, Eh,Th)f (7h,  Eh,1, *  *,e  h,Th)
h=1
H  Th
=  n7  q(/h) J7  1(6e,t  =  Vh,t  - 77h)qS(Eh,t)
h=l  t=1
where I(-) is the indicator function.  In the last step we used that both 7q  and Ei,t
follow normal distributions  (as was  assumed  earlier).
Next we  have to focus  on f(v10).  Note that
Vh,i  =  Wh,t  - i0  - /lWh,t-1  -62mhnh,t  - 0
33,t-1  - #4rt-,  - Zh/5
=  /0  + 461Wh,t-1  +  2n2mh,t + 43Sh,t-1 +  / 4rt_j  +  Zh45  +  Vh,t
- 0-  h,t-1  - 2mh,t  - 3Sh,t-1  - 64rt1 - Zh-z5
(o  - o) +  (/1 - /I)Wh,t-1  +  (C2 - 12)mh,t
+ (/33 -63)Sh,t-1  + rt-I (34  - /4)  + Zh(45 - i5) +  Oh,t
33This implies that the  vectorized  matrix  v  is  asymptotically  normal  distributed
with mean  the vectorized matrix v and variance-covariance  matrix XQX', where
X is a matrix that contains rows  [1; wh,t-; mh,t; sh,t-;  rt-;  zhI-
To optimize  the loglikelihood  function  given  above  we  use  simulated  maxi-
mum  likelihood  estimation  (e.g.  Stern,  1997).  We  draw  1000  times from  the
distribution  f(,q, e[).  For  each  draw j  =  1, ...,1000 we  follow  procedure:  (i)
given  the values  0  we generate  a matrix  vj,  (ii)  we  generate  a vector  qj  with
household  specific  effects  from  a normal  distribution  with mean 0 and variance
&2, (iii)  we compute the matrix of shocks  Ej = Vj - j,  (iv) we compute the like-
lihood contribution  and we weight this by pj  =  O(ej),  (v)  we sum  the weighted
individual  likelihood  contributions  and  optimize  its logarithm.  The  estimation
results are given in Table 9
34Cattle type  Survival  (%)  Survival  (%)
1987/1988  1991/1992
Bulls  90.6  34.0
Oxen  96.0  33.6
Cows  71.3  26.9
Heifers  76.3  76.9
Male  calf  81.4  37.5
Female calf  58.3  41.2
Source:  Scoones,  Chibudu,  Chikura,  Jeranyama,  Machaka,  Machanja,  Mavedzenge,
Mombeshora,  Mudhara,  Mudziwo,  Murimbarimba and Zirereza  (1996).
Table  1:  Cattle survival rates  for beasts  kept near Chivi in South  Zimbabwe.
35Year  Sample size  Number  Average  Rainfall in
at beginning  of  age of  previous  season
of year  marriages  marriage  local  Zimbabwe
Mpfurudzi
1994  215  34  20.5  0.69  0.52
1995  209  29  19.9  0.52  0.42
1996  202  26  19.3  0.77  0.70
1997  182  25  19.4  1.25  0.75
1998  180  17  18.4  0.70  0.53
1999  169  25  18.9  0.99  0.78
Mutanda
1994  84  9  21.1  0.72  0.52
1995  80  7  23.3  0.58  0.42
1996  86  10  18.4  0.93  0.70
1997  76  11  19.0  0.97  0.75
1998  63  3  18.3  0.70  0.53
1999  58  3  19.0  1.27  0.78
Sengezi  |
1994  60  7  20.0  0.52  0.52
1995  60  9  18.1  0.47  0.42
1996  55  9  19.9  0.90  0.70
1997  51  5  20.8  0.96  0.75
1998  44  1  16.0  0.72  0.53
1999  39  3  17.7  0.95  0.78
[Total  |  _|  233  J  _  ]  l
Explanatory note:  The quantity of rainfall is measured in meters per year and collected  by the
Department  of Meteorological Services  in Zimbabwe.
Table  2:  Some  annual statistics  of the sample  of unmarried  women  in  the age
interval  between  15  and  30.
36Head of cattle
0-2  3-4  5+
1994  20.2  21.4  22.0
1995  19.1  22.4  21.4
1996  20.7  20.8  19.8
1997  20.4  19.3  21.0
1998  18.9  19.5  19.8
1999  19.2  17.5  19.7
Table  3:  Average  age at which  a daughter  gets married stratified  by the year of
marriage and the herd size (cows, bulls, trained oxen and heifers)  of the household.
[Variable  Average|
Region
Mpfurudzi  (%)  63
Mutanda  (%)  21
Sengezi  (%)  16
Individual  characteristics
African faith  (%)  17
Masowe faith (%)  6
Household characteristics
Missing (%)  10
Household  size  (persons)  12
Father  absent  (%)  17
Mother  absent  (%)  4
Age father  (years)  53
Age mother (years)  45
Years  of education  father  5.1
Years  of eduction  mother  4.1
Number of observations  691
Explanatory  note:  Age of the father and the mother  are measured  at the moment the daughter
was  15 years  of age.  Household  size is measured  at  the moment  the women  first  appeared in
the stock sample.
Table 4:  Stock sample characteristics.
37Year  Sample  size at  Number  of  Average  age
beginning of year:  marriages J  of marriage
1994  62  0
1995  122  1  16.0
1996  175  8  16.3
1997  204  13  17.1
1998  219  12  17.3
1999  221  23  18.6
Total  j  57  1
Table  5:  Some annual statistics of the flow sample of unmarried  women.
Year  Livestock  wealth
|_____  |Not married  Married
1994  9.7  -
1995  11.3  0.5
1996  12.0  6.6
1997  12.7  10.7
1998  13.6  9.1
1999  13.4  14.7
Explanatory  note:  In  1995,  the  prices  (in  Zimbabwean  dollars)  of cattle  were:  Cows  1200;
Heifer  1000; Trained ox 1800; Young ox 1000; Bull  1500; and Goat 85.
Table 6:  Average livestock wealth  (in its real value in  1995)  owned  by the house-
hold,  stratified by the women  getting married in a particular year or not.
38|  | Marriage hazard]
Unobserved  heterogeneity
vl  -2.41  (0.41)
V2  -4.15  (0.83)
Pi  0.78  (0.41)
P2  0.22  (0.11)
Baseline  hazard (Age)
A15:16  0
A17:18 0.70  (0.33)
A19:20 1.23  (0.30)
A21:22 1.79  (0.36)
A23:24 1.98  (0.61)
A25+  2.90  (0.82)




Mutanda  -0.42  (0.19)
Sengezi  |-0.21  (0.19)
Individual characteristics
African  faith  -0.094  (0.22)
Masowe  faith  |-0.20  (0.27)
Household  characteristics
Missing  0.44  (0.29)
Household  size  0.021  (0.014)
Father  absent  -0.27  (0.23)
Mother  absent j -0.17  (0.30)
i  logLI  C  -2257.49
|  _N  l  691
Explanatory note:  Standard  errors in parentheses.
Table  7:  Estimation  results of the model using the stock sampling scheme.
39|  | Marriage hazard
Intercept
v  n  -5.00  (0.94)
Baseline  hazard (Age)
A 15-1 6 0
A17-18  1.05  (0.39)
)\19-20  2.11  (0.47)
Rainfall  (in meters)
l  0.77  (0.77)
Region
Mpfurudzi  0
Mutanda  -0.31  (0.38)
Sengezi  -0.46  (0.43)
Individual characteristics
African  faith  -0.61  (0.63)
Masowe faith  -0.35  (0.58)
Oldest daughter  0.45  (0.33)
Household  characteristics
Missing  1.48  (0.56)
Household  size  j  0.080  (0.025)
Parent  absent  0.38  (0.38)
Livestock  wealth  (in cows)  -0.028  (0.019)
l  _log_  J  -186.90
|N  l  333l
Explanatory  note:  Standard errors  in parentheses.
Table 8:  Estimation results of the  model using the flow sampling  scheme.
40Marriage hazard]
Intercept  -5  (
v  . -5.38  (  9
Baseline  hazard (Age)
A15-16  0
A17-18  1.04  (0.40)
A19-20  2.02  (0.52)
Rainfall  (in meters)
l  0.64  (0.77)
Region
Mpfurudzi  0
Mutanda  -0.26  (0.39)
Sengezi  -0.50  (0.45)
Individual characteristics
African  faith  -0.78  (0.67)
Masowe faith  -0.40  (0.61)
Oldest daughter  0.51  (0.35)
Household  characteristics
Missing  1.97  (0.56)
Household  size  0.083  (0.027)
Parent absent  0.41  (0.39)
Livestock wealth shock  (ai,t in cows)  -0.10  (0.049)
Livestock wealth  level  (tqi in cows)  -0.025  (0.026)
log  |  -185.76
N  l  _  333_l
Explanatory note:  Standard errors in  parentheses.
Table 9:  Estimation results using the flow sample of the model that distinguishes
between  household specific livestock  wealth effects and  (unanticipated)  shocks in
household's  livestock  wealth.
41Bride wealth payments
_Short term  Long term
Intercept  1.02  (3.10)  1.73  (1.35)
Age  -1.14  (0.090)  0.024  (0.051)
Rainfall  -1.85  (3.11)  -1.21  (1.51)
Oldest daughter  0.72  (0.62)  -0.14  (0.41)
Livestock wealth  (in cows)  -0.043  (0.035)  0.027  (0.019)
I  a  0.93  (0.037) ]  2.08  (0.097)]
rN  424  l  174
Explanatory  note:  Standard errors  in parentheses.
Table  10:  Estimation  results  of the  censored  regression  (tobit)  model  for  the
amount of bride  wealth  (in cows)  received  in the year of marriage (short  term)
and received  in total  (long term).
42AWh,t
AWh,t-1  /i  0.053  (0.086)
Amh,t  /2  0.81  (0.64)
ASh,t-.1  /3  -0.0061  (0.098)
Arh,t-I  /4  0.73  (0.64)
02  21.4
AWh,t-1  Amh,t
Intercept  'yo  0.80  (0.28)  Jo  0.12  (0.019)
Wh,t-2  yi  -0.43  (0.028)  61  -0.00064  (0.0019)
Wh,t-3  72  0.42  (0.031)  62  0.00025  (0.0020)
mh,t-1  -y3  0.70  (0.48)  63  -0.92  (0.032)
ASh,t-1  74  0.091  (0.073)  64  0.0086  (0.0048)
ASh,t-2  75  0.14  (0.063)  64  0.011  (0.0041)
Arh,t-I  -76  0.19  (0.55)  64  -0.0032  (0.036)
Arh,t-2  y7  0.36  (0.57)  64  0.047  (0.037)
R2  0.20  0.48
F7, 998 34.7  128.91
H  290
Eh= (Th - 1)  1006
Explanatory  note:  (corrected)  standard errors in parentheses.
Table  11:  Estimation  results of 2SLS  for ,1,  /2,  /3,  and /4.
Intercept  Bo  10.53  (2.78)
Mutunda  85  -2.09  (1.31)
Sengezi  fl5  0.61  (1.35)
Parent absent  /5  -1.67  (1.25)
African faith  /5  2.05  (1.46)
Masowe  faith  /5  -0.058  (2.19)
2,  69.8
[H  1  290
Explanatory  note:  (corrected)  standard  errors in parentheses.
Table  12:  Estimation  results of OLS for /3  and  /5.
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Figure  1:  The fraction of the marriages  where all bride wealth payments are made
at  a  given  number  of years  of marriage.  This  figure  is  based  on  a  supplement
held  in  1995 of the data used  in this paper.
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Figure  3:  Kaplan-Meier  estimate  of the survivor  function.  This shows  the  per-
centage  of women still unmarried  at a given  age.
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